Abstract: In the present paper we consider a one-sector growth model in continuous time with a production externality and endogenous labor supply. There is a continuum of households who have identical preferences but differ with respect to their initial wealth. We show that there exist economies such that an indeterminate steady state exists for some wealth distribution but not for others. A second result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive output to a poverty trap in which output converges asymptotically to zero. These results indicate that differences in the wealth distribution may be responsible for drastic differences in the long-run standard of living.
Introduction
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the effect of the initial wealth distribution on the dynamics and the determinacy of equilibria in a continuous-time model with heterogenous and infinitely-lived households, endogenous labor supply, and production externalities. To our knowledge, this is the first time that the issue of indeterminacy is addressed in a dynamic model with heterogeneous agents.
1 Due to the particular form of preferences and technology that we choose, we are able to obtain an extended characterization of the dynamics produced by the model. We can show that there exist economies for which an indeterminate steady state exists for some initial distributions of wealth but not for others. Another result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive production either into a poverty trap, in which output converges asymptotically to zero, or into a situation in which no equilibrium exists at all. We provide an example in which this effect occurs for a redistribution that consists simply in equalizing wealth levels across all individuals.
These results show that the initial wealth distribution has several channels through which it can affect the long-run behavior of the economy.
To put our results into proper perspective, it is useful to relate them to some recent contributions to the literature. Early neoclassical models have the property that for any given specification of the production technolgy and the households' preferences (satisfying standard convexity assumptions), the long-run behavior of all equilibria is the same. This is the case because these models have a unique and globally attractive stationary equilibrium. There are several ways in which these simple models can be extended so as to produce multiple equilibria or multiple balanced growth paths. The inclusion of leisure in the households' preferences is one of them.
Models in which the assumption of endogenous labor supply generates multiple equilibria have been explored within the neoclassical framework (see, e.g., de Hek [4] and Sorger [13] ) and within the framework of endogenous growth theories (see, e.g., Ladron-de-Guevara et al. [10] , de Hek [5] , and Sorger [14] ). As multiplicity of stationary equilibria or balanced growth paths typically implies that the initial conditions have an effect on the eventual fate of the economy, it follows that differences in the long-run performance of economies are due to "historical reasons".
Empirical studies, however, do not single out any aggregate macroeconomic variable (such as, for example, average income) as an obvious candidate that determines the long-run behavior.
It is therefore sensible to consider a disaggregated variable as the determining factor. In the present paper we focus on the initial distribution of wealth, that is, on the individual income levels of all households.
A second possible explanation of non-convergence, i.e., of different long-run performances of similar economies, is based on the existence of multiple equilibrium paths (quite often even infinitely many of them) that start at the same initial condition. Such indeterminacy has been shown in a variety of models with externalities and endogenous labor supply, as in Benhabib and Perli [2] and Benhabib and Farmer [1] . These economies are difficult to analyze, because there are different possible (rational) beliefs about the future evolution of the economy, and the actual evolution of the economy depends on how these beliefs are coordinated. It follows that these economies are very sensitive to social and political choices, whereby this is perhaps even more relevant when the choice between leisure and labor is at stake. In other words, similar countries may end up with different growth patterns on the sole ground of different expectations.
In the present paper we combine the two routes described above. More specifically, we construct a model in which the occurrence of multiplicity and indeterminacy itself depends on the value of a disaggregated variable, namely on the initial wealth distribution. This approach can therefore explain why, in some countries but not in others, output growth seems to follow multiple regimes that are associated with differences in the supply of labor.
2 Our model describes a one-sector economy in which output is produced from capital and labor by a Cobb-Douglas technology.
Total factor productivity depends on a production externality which is taken as given by the representative firm. There exists a continuum of households which can be of two types. The two types differ from each other only with respect to their initial wealth. All households have identical preferences described by a discounted utility functional. We assume that the instantaneous utility function is CES in consumption and logarithmic in leisure. The presence of production externalities (destroying the usual convexity properties) and heterogeneous agents complicates the analysis of the model considerably. We follow a general strategy that is similar to Negishi's classical approach as modified by Kehoe et al. [9] . In our framework, this can be explained as follows. For every competitive equilibrium there exists a corresponding value, denoted by ν which describes the relative welfare weight given to type-1 agents. We first analyse the dynamics for any given value of ν and study then which values of ν do actually occur in equilibrium. Since the value of ν is endogenously determined by the individual initial values of wealth, this approach is appropriate for the analysis of the effect of the wealth distribution on equilibrium dynamics. It should be pointed out that in convex models with heterogeneous agents, Negishi's approach is a standard tool and was used in various papers, as for example in Bewley [3] . Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne [7] use this approach to show that the initial distribution of capital affects the dynamics in a neoclassical two-sector model with a single consumption good and exogenously determined labor supply.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 studies the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock and the aggregate labor supply.
Section 4 discusses local uniqueness and indeterminacy for the disaggregated dynamical system and section 5 discusses a few possible effects of redistributing wealth among individuals. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
Model formulation and equilibrium conditions
We consider a continuous-time model of a one-sector economy in which at each time t ∈ [0, ∞) output Y (t) is produced from capital K(t) and labor L(t) by the Cobb-Douglas technology
where α ∈ (0, 1) is constant. The representative firm takes total factor productivity A(t) as given. In equilibrium, A(t) is determined by a production externality of the form
where η and η are positive numbers. We define a = α(1 + η) and b = (1− α)(1 + η ) and assume that a < 1. Output is the numeraire good and we denote by r(t) and w(t) the rental rate of capital and the wage rate at time t. At every instant t, the representative firm maximizes profits
subject to (1), whereby both factor prices and A(t) are taken as given.
There exists a continuum of measure 1 of households. For simplicity, we assume that there exist only two types of households and that the two types differ from each other only with respect to their initial wealth. Let us call the two types 0 and 1 and let us suppose that 1 − λ is the measure of type-0 households and λ is the measure of type-1 households. We assume λ ∈ (0, 1).
At time t, all households of type i ∈ {0, 1} consume at the rate c i (t) ≥ 0 and supply labor at the rate i (t) ∈ [0, 1) to the firms. All households have identical preferences described by the utility functional
where ρ > 0 denotes the time preference rate. We assume that the instantaneous utility function has the form
with θ > 0 and β > 0. Furthermore, we denote by δ > 0 the constant depreciation rate of capital and by r(t) − δ the interest rate. Let k i (t) be the wealth of type-i household, i ∈ {0, 1}, at time t and denote by k i0 the exogenously given initial wealth of this household. With these notations, the intertemporal budget constraint of a type-i household can be written aṡ
whereby the first equation describes the wealth accumulation while the second one is a transversality condition (no Ponzi-game condition).
The factor markets are in equilibrium if
holds for all t. The output market is in equilibrium if
for all t, where C(t) = (1−λ)c 0 (t)+λc 1 (t) denotes aggregate consumption. Since the population is constant and has measure 1, Y (t), A(t), K(t), L(t), and C(t) can be interpreted as aggregate variables or as per-capita variables.
Definition 1 A family of functions
is an equilibrium if (i) for all t ∈ [0, +∞), the pair (K(t), L(t)) maximizes profit Π(t) subject to the technological constraint (1) and non-negativity constraints on the inputs,
(ii) the consistency condition (2) holds for all t ∈ [0, +∞),
is an optimal solution to the problem of maximizing J subject to (3)- (4), (iv) the market clearing conditions (5) and (6) hold for all t ∈ [0, +∞).
An equilibrium is called stationary if it consists of constant functions.
Profit maximization under perfect competition implies that capital and labor earn their marginal products. Together with the consistency condition (2) this yields
Conditions (1)- (3), (5), and (7) imply that (6) is satisfied (Walras' law). Thus, we may disregard condition (6) . The first-order optimality conditions for the optimization problem of a type-i household are
In the following lemma we summarize the equilibrium conditions and draw a simple conclusion.
Lemma 1 (i) A family of functions
is an equilibrium if and only if the conditions (1)- (5) and (7)- (9) hold for all t ∈ [0, +∞) and
(ii) In every equilibrium there exist constants µ > 0 and ν > 0 such that c 1 (t)/c 0 (t) = µ and
Proof: Statement (i) is well known, sufficiency being implied by concavity. From condition (9) followsċ 1 (t)/c 1 (t)−ċ 0 (t)/c 0 (t) = 0. It is straightforward to see that this implies that c 1 (t)/c 0 (t)
is constant with respect to time. Together with (8) this shows that
Note that part (ii) states that the ratio of individual consumption of type 1 over type 0 and the ratio of individual leisure of type 1 over type 0 are constant along the equilibrium path.
This is a consequence of the adopted specification of the utility function. Since the constant ν plays a central role in the results presented below, it is worth pointing out that it has a very natural interpretation. Consider a central planner who maximizes the weighted average of all households' utility functions subject to the technological constraint (1) and the balance
the central planner's problem is called a pseudo-Pareto optimum, because the central planner does not internalize the externality (2) . Suppose furthermore that the central planner uses the welfare weight γ i for each agent of type i ∈ {0, 1}. It is straightforward to show that the pseudo-Pareto optimum corresponding to these welfare weights must satisfy the condition
We can therefore interpret the constant ν as the relative welfare weight given to type-1 agents in a pseudo-Pareto optimum.
For every number ν > 0 let us define
The next lemma presents a set of equilibrium conditions which is different from the one stated in lemma 1(i). The advantage of these alternative conditions is that the equilibrium dynamics of the variables k 0 (t), k 1 (t), and L(t) are isolated, and that all other variables are expressed in
, and the parameter ν from lemma 1.
Lemma 2 A family of functions
is an equilibrium if and only if there exists a number ν > 0 such that the differential equationṡ
hold, where
and conditions (1) , (2) , (4) , (5) , and (7) as well as
hold for all t ∈ [0, +∞). 3 We write K instead of (1 − λ)k 0 + λk 1 .
Proof: We first prove necessity. Condition (15) follows from lemma 1(ii) and (5). Condition (16) follows from (15) and 0 ≤ i (t) < 1. Condition (14) follows from (7), (8) , and (15). Adding the two equations in (14) with weights 1 − λ and λ yields (13) . Substituting (7), (14) , and (15) into (3) yields (10) . Equation (11) is derived analogously. To prove (12) it is convenient to use the variables x i (t) = 1 − i (t) and
From (15), (8), and (7) we obtaiṅ
Solving this equation forẊ(t) and using (9), (6), and (7) one getṡ
C(t) K(t) .
Substituting C(t) from (13) into this equation one obtains (12) . Thus, we have proved the necessity of the conditions stated in the lemma. Since all steps are reversible, sufficiency follows as well.
The dynamical system (10)-(12) specifies the evolution of capital and labor in any given equilibrium. It is important to stress that the parameter ν is part of the definition of the equilibrium, its value being endogenously determined by the initial conditions k 00 and k 01 .
Aggregate dynamics
In this section we focus on the dynamic properties of the aggregate variables K(t) and L(t).
We shall use these properties later when we study the dynamics of individual variables. This approach is somewhat similar to the usual strategy of focusing first on the set of (constrained) efficient allocations disregarding the role of the initial distribution. In our case, the influence of the initial distribution is reflected by the parameter ν, which we have shown to be the relative welfare weight of type-1 agents versus type-0 agents. The role of this parameter is therefore the same as that of the welfare weights in Negishi's approach to general equilibrium (see Negishi [11] or Kehoe et al. [9] ). We will state conditions on the economy and on ν ensuring the existence of multiple steady states and we shall obtain some properties of these equilibria. Furthermore, we will also characterize a situation in which along every equilibrium output must converge to zero.
First, the differential equation describing aggregate capital is obtained. Adding equations (10) and (11) with weights 1 − λ and λ, respectively, one obtainṡ
The analysis in this section is based on equations (12) and (17), describing the dynamics of aggregate labor and aggregate capital, respectively. (12) and (17) is bounded.
Lemma 3 Every trajectory of system
Proof: The result follows easily from g(k 0 , k 1 , 0) = g(k 0 , k 1 , 1) = 0 and the fact that the right hand side of (17) is negative for all
The following lemma characterizes the fixed points of system (12) and (17).
Lemma 4 Let K(t) = K and L(t) = L be a fixed point of the system of differential equations (12) and (17). If
and
Proof: If L = 0 then it is obvious from (17) thatK(t) = 0 implies
then it is obvious from (17) thatK(t) = 0 implies K(t) = K = δ 1/(a−1) . Finally consider the case 0 < L < 1. In this case,L(t) = 0 implies that
Substituting this into (17) it follows that (18) must hold. Using (18) in (20), we find that (19) must hold as well.
Note that the above lemma does not assert the existence of all three types of steady states. We will see later that the situation in which no interior steady state satisfying (18) and (19) exists will be of particular interest. The following lemma shows that neither the fixed point (K, L) = (δ 1/(a−1) , 1) nor any trajectory converging to this fixed point qualifies as an equilibrium.
Lemma 5 There does not exist an equilibrium satisfying the conditions lim
and lim t→+∞ L(t) = 1. Furthermore, since K(t) converges to a positive number, we obtain also
Because of K(t) = (1 − λ)k 0 (t) + λk 1 (t) this is a contradiction to the fact that condition (4) must hold for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
It will be shown below (theorem 1) that there does not necessarily exist an interior steady state, that is, there may not exist a solution to equations (18) and (19). The following lemma shows that in this case every equilibrium has the property that the economy is in a poverty trap and output converges to 0.
librium, and let ν > 0 be the corresponding number defined in lemmas 1 and 2. If equations (18) and (19) do not have a solution, then it follows that lim t→+∞ K(t) = lim t→+∞ L(t) = lim t→+∞ Y (t) = 0.
Proof: From lemma 3 we know that every trajectory of system (12) and (17) must be bounded and, therefore, must have a non-empty ω-limit. The Poincare-Bendixson theorem tells us that the ω-limit is the union of fixed points, heteroclinic orbits, homoclinic orbits, and closed orbits. By assumption, there exist at most two fixed points of system (12) and (17), namely,
. Lemma 5 rules out that the ω-limit of an equilibrium trajectory is the fixed point (K, L) = (δ 1/(a−1) , 1) or a heteroclinic orbit converging to that fixed point. If the ω-limit were a homoclinic orbit or a closed orbit, there would have to exist another fixed point in the area of the phase plane that is inside this orbit. Since no such fixed point exists, the only possible case is that the ω-limit is the fixed point (K, L) = (0, 0). Obviously, this implies also lim t→+∞ Y (t) = 0. Now let us assume that there exists an interior fixed point of system (12) and (17), i.e., there exists a pair (K ν , L ν ) satisfying equations (18) and (19) for some value of ν. The following lemma characterizes more precisely the interior steady states.
Lemma 7 (i) If equations (18) and (19) have a solution
where
(
ii) If θ > b/(a + b − 1) then the function H has a one-humped graph with H(0) = H(1) = 0.

The function H attains its unique maximum at
Proof: Solving equation (18) for K and substituting the result into (19) yields the first result.
The second result is obvious.
We are now ready to present our first main result which shows that there exists an open set of economies for which, depending on the value of ν, either multiple stationary equilibria or no stationary equilibria exist. To this end we need the Jacobian matrix of the dynamical system (12) and (17) evaluated at K(t) = K ν and L(t) = L ν . We denote this matrix by
=Kν ,L(t)=Lν
We have
From this we obtain
The following theorem shows how the dynamic properties of the equilibrium path depend on the value of ν. Note that the result holds for an open set of economies, i.e., for an open set of parameters of the model.
Theorem 1 Letν be implicitly defined by Lν =L, whereL is given by (22). There exists an open set of economies such that the following two conditions are true.
(i) There exists > 0 such that for all ν ∈ (ν − ,ν) one can find two interior stationary
. For these stationary equilibria it holds that
ii) For all ν ∈ (ν, 1] there does not exist an interior stationary equilibrium. In this case, output converges to 0 along every equilibrium (poverty trap).
Proof: We first show that there exists an economy such that 
(ii) Since H(L) attains its unique maximum at L =L = Lν, it follows from the strict monotonicity of B(ν) that for all ν ∈ (ν, 1] equation (21) does not have a solution. This implies that equations (18) and (19) do not have a solution which, together with lemma 6, gives the result.
It follows from theorem 1 that we can find pairs of stationary equilibria (that are arbitrarily close to each other) such that for one equilibrium the Jacobian has a negative trace and a negative determinant, whereas for the other one the Jacobian has a negative trace but a positive determinant. It also follows that we can find situations for which the economy is in a poverty trap or has no equilibrium at all. Note that, in the original disaggregated model, the value of ν is endogenously determined by the initial conditions k 00 and k 01 .
In the next section we shall show that stationary equilibria with a negative trace and a negative determinant are locally unique whereas stationary equilibria with a negative trace and a positive determinant are not locally unique, i.e. they are indeterminate.
We would also like to point out that in the case where θ ≤ b/(a + b − 1) a bifurcation similar to the one described in theorem 1 cannot occur. Indeed, such a bifurcation requires that the determinant changes from negative to positive at a certain critical valueν. This means Det J(Kν, Lν) = 0. Because of (23) this implies that
, then this would lead to Lν ≤ 0 which is not possible. If θ = 1, then the above expression for Lν is not well defined. Finally, if θ < 1, then we would obtain
which is also impossible.
Local uniqueness and indeterminacy
In the present section we focus on the issue of indeterminacy. We say that an equilibrium E is indeterminate if, in any neighborhood of E, there exists an infinite set of equilibrium paths starting from the same initial wealth distribution. Conversely, an equilibrium E is locally unique, if there exists a neighborhood of E such that the only equilibrium in that neighborhood is E. To distinguish between local uniqueness and indeterminacy of stationary equilibria we have to analyze the full dynamic system (10)- (12) that governs the evolution of the capital stocks held by the two types of individuals. Fortunately, the stability properties of this system and system (12) and (17) are closely connected. Let (K ν , L ν ) be an interior fixed point of (12) and (17). The corresponding fixed point in the full system is denoted by (k 0ν , k 1ν , L ν ). Let J (ν) be the Jacobian matrix of (10)- (12) 
Note that the following conditions hold
Using (28) of an equilibrium path converging to the fixed point (k 0ν , k 1ν , L ν ). Generically, 
is a three-dimensional manifold in (k 0 , k 1 , L) space, and the intersection of W 3 with the line defined by k 0 = k 0ν and k 1 = k 1ν is a line segment containing the point (k 0ν , k 1ν , Lν). Consider any point on this line segment together with the corresponding value of ν ∈ I. Since the point is on the stable manifold of system (10)- (12) with the chosen value of ν, the trajectory starting in that point converges to (k 0ν , k 1ν , L ν ). Therefore, it satisfies all equilibrium conditions stated in lemma 2. This implies that there exists a continuum of equilibria with initial endowments (k 0ν , k 1ν ). The stationary equilibrium (k 0ν , k 1ν , Lν) is therefore not locally unique (i.e. it is indeterminate). Note that each of the equilibria starting in (k 0ν , k 1ν ) is characterized by a certain value of ν. Alternatively, one could also parametrize the equilibria by the initial labor supply L(0). The time paths of the aggregate variables corresponding to a given equilibrium can be found from equations (12) and (17). In view of equation (15) The above discussion implicitly assumes that W 2 and W 3 are locally smooth manifolds of dimension 2 and 3. In particular, this means that in a neighborhood of the steady state (k 0ν , k 1ν , Lν) the set W 2 is a non-vertical smooth surface and a that similar three dimensional version of this property holds for W 3 .
Regularity assumption:
There exists an open set of economies satisfying the conditions of theorem 1 such that the sets W 2 and W 3 are locally smooth manifolds of dimension two and three.
The regularity assumption is likely to hold generically but its proof is probably very tedious, since it rests on how the dynamics depend on the parameter ν. Indeed, each W s (ν) is associated to a given value of ν and it is hard to determine how W s (ν) changes as ν varies. Clearly, in view of the set of equations representing the dynamical system, it is expected that the regularity assumption holds generically.
We can now state the following theorem concerning the occurrence of indeterminacy. 
Possible effects of redistributions
The previous section says nothing about the role of the initial distribution of capital for a given value of the aggregated capital. In this section we want to demonstrate that a redistribution of capital between households at time 0 can change the structure of equilibria in a quite dramatic way. Consider the set of economies satisfying the conditions of theorem 1. Let (K ν , L ν ) be one of the two stationary equilibria whose existence is ascertained in theorem 1(i). Let us furthermore assume that the corresponding individual capital holdings are (k 0ν , k 1ν ) and that the economy starts from these initial capital stocks. This means that the economy is in an interior stationary equilibrium with positive production at all times. Now suppose that the government equalizes the wealth levels of all households by means of a redistribution. This means that, after the redistribution, the new initial condition satisfies k 00 = k 10 and (1 − λ)k 00 + λk 10 = K ν . Because after the redistribution all households are identical they solve the same optimization problem.
Since this problem has a strictly concave utility function, the solution is unique. We can therefore conclude that all households choose the same consumption paths and make the same labor supply decisions. This, in turn, implies that ν = 1 must hold (see lemma 1). From theorem 1(ii) it follows that equations (18) Another open question is whether redistributions of wealth may lead from a determinate equilibrium to an indeterminate one. We see two possible approaches to this question. The first possibility would be to prove that the boundary between the set of initial capital levels that lead to determinate equilibria and the set of initial capital levels that lead to indeterminate equilibria does not coincide with a line along which (1 − λ)k 00 + λk 10 is constant. The other way is perhaps easier. One could try to determine whether all equilibria starting from initial conditions with a homogeneous wealth distribution are determinate (or indeterminate) independently of the size of the initial endowment. Let us assume that they are all determinate.
Consider the situation discussed in the first paragraph of this section. If we know that the poverty trap equilibria starting from k 00 = k 10 are determinate, then we choose as our initial situation the stationary equilibrium (k 0ν , k 1ν , L ν ) which is indeterminate. In this case, the equalization of wealth levels would lead from an indeterminate interior stationary equilibrium to a determinate poverty trap equilibrium. On the other hand, if we know that the poverty trap equilibria starting from k 00 = k 10 are indeterminate, then we choose as our initial situation the stationary equilibrium (k 0ν , k 1ν , L ν ) which is determinate. In this case, the equalization of wealth levels would lead from a determinate interior stationary equilibrium to an indeterminate poverty trap equilibrium. The details of these arguments are left for future research.
Conclusion
The results obtained in the present paper indicate that differences in the wealth distribution may be responsible for drastic differences in the long-run standard of living. In fact this may occur through two channels. Countries with identical opportunities and preferences for consumption and leisure but differing initial distribution of wealth may follow different growth paths. In particular, a redistribution of wealth may have such a drastic impact on the economy as for example driving the country into a poverty trap. A second way of how the wealth distribution may affect the economy is simply because it may generate multiplicity or indeterminacy.
plying labor at different levels only due to different beliefs, i.e. despite the fact that leisure and consumption are valued identically and that the endowments and the technology are identical.
It follows that these economies are very sensitive to social and political choices.
An open question is to which extent the present results hold in a general model with endogenous labor and externalities on production. Clearly, our approach was possible thanks to the special form of the utility function. Indeed, for more general forms the parameter ν will not be as useful in the analysis. However, we do not see any reason why the result should be qualitatively different. Another topic which we have not addressed is the asymptotic behavior of the model for vanishing discount rate or for vanishing externalities. 
